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The re-regulation processes of network industries transforms property rights arrangements and policy de-
signs. This article presents the “institutional network regime” framework and underlines the key, but under-
estimated, role of infostructure.
Since the beginning of the 1990’s, political scientists have studied the design and implementation of regula-
tory reforms in liberalized network industries. ese stud-
ies have mainly focused, in Europe, on the comparison of 
regulatory regimes in multiple countries (Coen & Héri-
tier, 2006; Eberlein & Grande, 2005; atcher, 1999; Vo-
gel, 1996). e common point of these reforms consists in 
implementing at different degrees the new textbook model 
of regulation (Joskow, 2006), which could be described 
through four main lines of reforms:
•	 the unbundling of the incumbent firm thanks to 
the formal or at least functional separation between 
service operation and infrastructure ownership;
•	 the opening up of competition on the market 
thanks to the opening of third party access to the 
network;
•	 the creation of a new and independent regulatory 
authority in order to guarantee the enforcement of 
sector-specific rules, as well as of competition in a 
non-discriminatory way;
•	 the publication of public service obligations and 
security standards.
e pace and modes of development of this new regu-
latory model varies along both sectoral and national po-
litical traditions. e recurrent conflicts generated by the 
regulatory reforms explain why the political science litera-
ture has mainly concentrated on these following dimen-
sions: conditions of unbundling, weight of the incumbent 
on new markets, formal or de facto independency of the 
regulatory agency, ownership of the network infrastruc-
ture, etc. is article goes one step further and is found-
ed on two basic premises. First, network infrastructures 
constitute artificial man-made resources providing crucial 
goods and services to citizens and consumers, the supply 
of which directly depends on the way the network infra-
structure is managed and its uses regulated. Second, the 
(political) regulation of these industry networks is usually 
the result of a combination of different public policies (pol-
icy design) and, from one or more property rights corpuses 
(property rights system). We define such a combination 
of institutional rules as an “institutional network regime”. 
Policy design and property rights system are relevant for 
analyzing the liberalization of network industries due to 
the fact that the unbundling and re-regulation processes 
create the need to reorganize property rights arrangements 
and to redesign policies. us, a new analytical framework 
that can combine these two central regulation modalities 
is required.
is article aims to briefly present the “institutional 
network regime” framework and to underline the key 
role of infostructure in the new regulatory model, a role 
that have been largely underestimated until now in the 
literature.
Theoretical framework: the institutional network 
regime (INR)
e INR framework considers network infrastructures as 
artificial resources used in more or less rival ways to pro-
vide various direct (e.g. transportation, urban services, en-
ergy) and indirect (e.g. capital investment, land use plan-
ning) services to more or less heterogeneous users groups. 
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us, network infrastructures can be described from vari-
ous perspectives: i.e. their morphological (i.e. physical and 
technical) characteristics or components, the level of their 
technical complexity, the different goods and services they 
provide, the intensity of the rivalries resulting from the 
different uses to which they are subjected and the impacts 
on their physical and human environment.
An institutional network regime (INR) is a specific type 
of regime related to the “institutional resource regimes” 
framework (Knoepfel, Nahrath, Varone 2007; Gerber et 
al. 2009), accord-
ing to which all 
regimes are based 
on the same neo-
ins t i tu t iona l i s t 
axiom: the uses 
made by individu-
als and groups of 
their natural and/
or built (artificial) 
environment is the 
primary – but not 
necessarily exclu-
sive – result of the 
incentives gener-
ated by the associ-
ated institutional 
a r r a n g e m e n t s , 
i.e. the systems of 
rules that these ar-
rangements have 
progressively intro-
duced to regulate the competing uses of natural and arti-
ficial “resources.”
e INR framework is the product of the combination 
of institutional economics (property rights theory) and 
policy analysis (policy design theories). By policy design we 
mean the aggregation of all use and protection policies 
that regulate the uses and rivalries, to which the natural, 
artificial or infrastructural resource is subjected. e prop-
erty rights system can be defined as the aggregation of all 
property rights involving the resource and its uses. e 
basic postulate is that the regulation of rivalries between 
network users is influenced by a combination of these two 
rules repertories.
us, by focusing the analysis on the complex inter-
play between policies and property rights, the INR con-
cept makes it possible to explain all issues associated with 
the vast redistribution of property and use rights occur-
ring during the liberalization and re-regulation process. In 
particular, it allows better analysing the risks of incoheren-
cies, blockages or even the collapse due to the unbundling 
of actors (from their tasks and rights) and to the growing 
heterogeneity of interests which both increase rivalries be-
tween users of the central infrastructural resource repre-
sented by the industry networks. Finally, it provides the 
analyst with specific hypotheses on the impacts of INR 
(change) on the actor configuration and the eight regulation 
functions.
e Actor Configuration (after liberalization) is com-
posed of all of the public and private actors involved in 
the functioning of the network industry itself and in ser-
vice delivery (e.g. 
owner and man-
ager of the net-
work, competing 
public and private 
operators, end 
beneficiaries of the 
network services 
and sector-specific 
regulator).
e Regulatory 
Framework encap-
sulates the various 
regulatory tasks 
or functions that 
must be fulfilled 
by the identified 
actors in a liber-
alized network 
industry. is 
framework could 
be describe through 
the analysis of eight main regulation functions the scope 
and the content of which are strongly dependent on the 
(change in the) INR:
1. the physical management of the network (e.g., con-
struction, maintenance, technological innovation, 
security); 
2. the conditions of access to and use of the network 
(e.g., operation and other competing uses);
3. the definition of the legal and ownership status of 
the different operators (e.g., privatization of the legal 
form and of the ownership) that have access and 
use rights to the network infrastructure at their 
disposal (e.g., concessions allocated to operators);
4. the definition of competition rules for private and/
or public operators (e.g., speed of market opening, 
categories of eligible customers, fair competition);
5. the definition of the public service obligations 
(PSO) (e.g., quality, accessibility and affordability 
of specific goods and services) and standards relat-
ing to the other uses of the networks;
Figure 1 | Detailed regulatory framework
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6. the arbitration of the rivalries and eventual con-
flicts between the different users of the network 
(e.g., between operators, between the operators 
and the network owners, between the consumers 
and the operators, between the network owners 
and the regulators);
7. the conditions of access to the natural and energy re-
sources used to produce urban goods and services 
(attribution of appropriation and use rights) or 
guarantee of supply of the different natural and 
energy resources necessary for the production 
and/or the provision of the different goods and 
services; and last but not least, 
8. the interconnection with other networks (either 
in the same sector, across national borders or 
between sectors as is the case, for example, for 
the electricity grid and the railway network). 
e INR framework is based on the assumption that 
the future of network industries depends essentially on 
the technical, social, economic and ecological uses made 
of them and on the regulation of these uses by means of 
institutional rules (i.e. public policies and property rights 
arrangements) and actor arrangements. In this sense, the 
management of such networks is not only a question of 
technical management but also one of policy regulation, 
social and ecological norms and economic management. 
e selected approach posits that network industries con-
stitute very important infrastructural resources for an entire 
series of actors. us the control of the network is a key 
issue in terms of the supply of public services obligations. 
It is therefore crucial to manage this infrastructural re-
source very carefully if the objective is to ensure its sus-
tainable use. Any failure in the provision of these services 
would have serious economic, social, and ecological im-
pacts for customers, i.e. private companies and individual 
passengers.
Infostructure as a missing link
e INR framework highlights the key role of a regula-
tion function which often remains on the dark-side of the 
textbook model of regulatory reforms: the management of 
infostructure which consists in monitoring the conditions 
of access and use of the infrastructure network (the regu-
lation function 2 described above). More precisely, one 
defines infostructure as the control and command services 
necessary to monitor the access to and to optimize the use 
of the infrastructure. It includes key and strategic services 
such as dispatching for the electricity sector, paths alloca-
tion and timetabling for railways and air traffic control 
and slots allocation for the aviation sector.
e genesis of the concept of infostructure is related to 
computer science but also to the new network economy 
(Curien, 2000, 1990) which define a network as a sum of 
three closely interconnected layers: 
•	 the first and deepest one is infrastructure composed 
of the nodes and the lines and by all the technical, 
material or immaterial equipments associated to the 
functioning of the network (radars for the air sector, 
electric pylons, railroads switches)
•	 the intermediary layer is infostructure which permits 
to access to the infrastructure for different service op-
erators and to optimize the use of infrastructure ;
•	 the highest and most visible layer is composed by final 
services which are provided by operators to end users 
thanks to the access and the use of infrastructure.
Concretely, infostructure is composed by a set of in-
termediary services and technical facilities, which are 
auto-consumed by the network (Curien, 2005: 9). e 
perimeter of the three layers varies with networks indus-
try sectors. For the aviation sector for instance, the infra-
structure layer is both material and immaterial, composed 
by airports, radars and air lanes whereas infostructure is 
determining in terms of physical equipments of air traf-
fic control, security facilities, airport services. In contrast, 
for the electricity sector the infrastructure of transport 
and distribution lines is much more capital intensive than 
the dispatching equipment of the infostructure layer, al-
though the dispatching function is strategic for the well 
functioning of the whole system and the balance between 
supply and demand.
e infostructure layer has known a major technologi-
cal development, which has often been key to liberalize. 
In the case of telecommunication services, one can cite 
the case of the ISDN development during the 1980‘s, 
which allows sharing the infrastructure between different 
uses and service operators. For the electricity, railway and 
aviation sectors, innovation in ICT helps to develop new 
services of communication, dispatching, control and coor-
dination between different service operators and to facili-
tate access of new entrants.
Considering the distinction between infrastructure 
and services, infostructure is usually considered as part of 
the infrastructure / network management function, under 
the responsibility of the owner of the network. However, 
at the intersection of infrastructure management and ser-
vice operation, the economic and institutional status of in-
fostructure remains unclear in the design of liberalization 
reforms. There is a sort of confusion between infrastructure 
ownership on one side and infostructure services management 
on the other. We claim thus that the control over infos-
tructure overcomes the simplistic role of network keeper 
(such as track maintenance, lines renewal) but is a strate-
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gic position to control or at least influence third party ac-
cess to the network. e capacity of the national railways 
companies to keep the control of the timetable production 
process as well as to orientate crucial decisions concern-
ing technical aspects of network management constitutes 
a good example of the capacity of incumbents to control 
the access to the network and to reduce the level of com-
petition within a liberalized industry sector. A number 
of other examples of competition reduction through the 
control of infostructure can be found in various sectors 
of network industry such as electricity, civil aviation, tele-
communication, etc.
In a nutshell, the textbook model of regulatory re-
forms focuses on the unbundling of infrastructure and ser-
vice layers and underestimates the role of the infostructure 
layer. e new regulatory model doesn’t consider clearly 
how and by whom the management of infostructure 
is and should be taken in charge, both empirically and 
theoretically. Whereas, for instance, the model of the in-
dependent regulatory authority has spread as a ‘best prac-
tice’ in Europe, to guarantee a non-discriminatory access 
to the market and the infrastructure, the rules related to 
infostructure management are still unclear. Infostructure 
management responsibility could stay in the hand of the 
incumbent firm, or could be delegated to the infrastruc-
ture owner or to an independent public or private body. 
Infostructure management represents therefore a great 
room of manoeuver for the incumbent firms, for the in-
frastructure owner or for national policy makers to in-
fluence the architecture and the functioning of the new 
market and its regulatory framework. What is sure is that 
the management of infostructure could limit the opening 
up to competition and at least influence the design of lib-
eralization and re-regulation process by determining the 
conditions of access to the infrastructure and modifying 
the capacity of the infrastructure network. Infostructure 
has therefore an impact on both infrastructure manage-
ment and on the structure of liberalizing markets, but re-
mains as the missing link of the new regulatory model of 
networked industries markets.
In sum, we suggest studying in more details which ac-
tor is responsible for managing infostructure and, how this 
role assignment influences the whole institutional network 
regime. We expect a major added-value of empirical studies 
currently lead on the aviation and railway in Switzerland 
within the framework of our SNF project, focusing on 
these analytical issues and practical challenges as well.  
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